In 2014-2015, the European Union adopted three financial measures in order to cooperate with neighbouring countries in the field of migration policy: the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the EU Trust Fund for Syrian refugees, and the Facility for refugees in Turkey. These European external migration funds are subject to the ordinary public procurement rules to which both the member states and EU institutions themselves are subject. However, for the projects implemented through these financial measures, there is often no open competition. How does this relate to European public procurement law?
Niger has implemented the UN Smuggling Protocol in such a manner that it introduced carrier sanctions on domestic bus travels. This implementation undermines free movement in the ECOWAS zone. The implementation has been sponsored by the EU through legal expertise, training and materials. This constitutes a continuation of European imperial history in Africa.
The New Borders of Empire. European migration policy and domestic passenger transport in Niger, in Paul Minderhoud, Sandra Mantu & Karin Zwaan (eds): Caught in Between Borders: Citizens, migrants and humans. Liber Amicorum in Honour of prof. dr. Elspeth Guild, Wolf Legal Publishers, Tilburg 2019, p. 49-57
Since 2014, the European Union has established three funds (for Africa, Syria, and refugees in Turkey) to implement its external migration policy. In this Article, we analyse whether these funds and their implementation are compatible with EU public procurement law. This leads to a mixed picture. The wholesale exemption of expenditure under the EU Trust Fund for Africa from public procurement is incompatible with EU law; the exemption is not motivated, and it is implausible that there is a crisis in all 26 African countries where the Trust Fund operates thorough the duration of the Trust Fund. However, some more limited exceptions may apply, allowing for exempting particular projects from public procurement. Whether or not public procurement has taken place is often not transparent. It is remarkable that the notion of emergency is used in a cursory manner. It is equally remarkable that European public procurement law is not well integrated in external migration policy.
European External Migration Funds and Public Procurement Law, in European Papers 4(2019):2, p. 493-521
Nieuwe Europees vluchtelingendeals zijn niet nodig. Het verdrag uit 1951 is nog altijd prima.
De volledige tekst verscheen in Trouw, 8 juli 2019.
It is not original to point out that the 2015 European refugee ‘crisis’ was not caused by numbers – Turkey hosted ten times as many Syrians per inhabitant as the EU, and Lebanon even 100 times more, while in addition Europe is much wealthier than these countries. It is also not original to point out that, instead of addressing the deficiencies of European asylum law, the EU has intensified its externalization policies, as evidenced by the March 2016 EU-Turkey deal and the EU Trust Fund for Africa. Thus, the dominant idea seems to be that in order to save free movement of persons in the Schengen zone, entry into Europe has been made ever more difficult. Although we do not want to quarrel with this (we can see perfectly well what this analysis is about), we do think it needs to be nuanced significantly.
The full text of this blogpost is on the RLI Blog.
This text describes the regularisations in Dutch migration policy in the period between 1975 and 1996 (as amended in 1999).
Een meerderheid in de Tweede Kamer wil dat het Kinderpardon wordt verruimd en dat in afwachting daarvan de betreffende kinderen niet worden uitgezet. Staatssecretaris Harbers wil de uitzetting niet opschorten en KLM voert aan dat het moet mee werken. Bestaat er zo’n verplichting voor luchtvaartmaatschappijen?
De volledige tekst werd gepubliceerd op Verblijfblog op 27 januari 2019.
Carrier sanctions, by which transport companies are penalised if they do not refuse embarkation to undocumented persons, play a role in perpetuating harms (denial of refugee protection; death) against migrants. They do so because transport companies are obliged to by legislation of destination states in Europe, North America and Australia. The potential accountability and responsibility of carriers for these harms has not been addressed in literature on human rights law. This article fills this gap through the application of Iris Young’s social connection model to address the contemporary harms of carrier sanctions. We propose that, faced with conflicting legal obligations, carriers have moral and legal obligations to remedy, through strategic actions, the harms to which they contribute. We outline a number of possible practices that carriers can use to do so.
Theodore Baird and Thomas Spijkerboer: Carrier Sanctions and the Conflicting Legal Obligations of Carriers- Addressing Human Rights Leakage, Amsterdam Law Forum 11(2019), 4-19
Since the end of the Cold War, migration law and policy of the global North has been characterised by externalisation, privatisation and securitisation. These developments
have been conceptualised as denying access to migrants and as politics of non-entrée. This article proposes to broaden the analysis, and to analyse unwanted migration as merely one form of international human mobility by relying on the concept of the global mobility infrastructure. The global mobility infrastructure consists of the physical structures, services and laws that enable some people to move across the globe with high speed, low risk, and at low cost. People who have no access to it travel slowly, with high risk and at high cost. Within the global mobility infrastructure, travellers benefit from advanced forms of international law. For the excluded, international law reflects and embodies their exclusion before, during and after their travel to the global North. Exclusion is based on nationality, race, class and gender. The notion of the global mobility infrastructure allows for questioning the way in which international law reproduces these forms of stratification.
The Global Mobility Infrastructure: Reconceptualising the Externalisation of Migration Control, European Journal of Migration and Law 20(2018), 452-469